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Agricultural cooperatives are often described as vertical extensions of the farm
enterprise. Their primary purpose is to provide services to their member-users on a
nonprofitbasis. Theseservices rangefrom theprovisionofproductioninputsthrough
the entire set ofassembling, processing, and marketing services required to deliver
their agricultural products to final consumers. Of course, cooperatives are not the
only providers ofeither farm inputs or marketing services. Typically they compete
with noncooperative firms and in some cases with other cooperatives.
The Capper-Volstead Act granted agricultural marketing cooperatives limited
exemptionfrom theantitrustlaws. As someagriculturalcooperativeshaveevolved into
large organizations that hold important market positions, there have been periodic
challenges ofthejustification for this exemption (Jesse). The National Commission
for the Review ofAntitrust Laws and Procedures specifically considered the antitrust
treatment of agricultural cooperatives (Mueller). The Commission concluded "that
the threatofmonopoly by some cooperatives is now substantial" (Vol. I, p. 259). The
Commission recommended: "The antitrust treatment of (agricultural) cooperatives
once formed...should be similar to that ofordinary business corporations. Specifi-
cally, mergers, marketing agencies incommon, and similar agreements amongcoop-
eratives should be allowed only if no substantial lessening of competition results"
(p. 253). The Commission, however, recognized that the unique characteristics of
cooperatives warranted more lenient standards for mergers and agreements among
cooperatives than among investor-owned firms.
The scrutiny placed on agricultural cooperatives during the late 1970s and early
1980s abated as antitrustenforcementwaned duringthe Reagan terms. Inlate 1988,
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however, the antitrust exemption of cooperatives was again questioned by a high
ranking government official. Daniel Oliver, then chairman of the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), told a press briefing: "There is no good reason to continue the
antitrust exemption for agricultural cooperatives...what may once have sparedsmall
groupsofindividual farmers from harassmentby overzealous antitrustlaw enforcers,
now serves principally to immunize agricultural behemoths, who do businessjustlike
other large food companies and should be subject to the same statutory obligations
as their competitors" (Food Institute Report, p. 10).
Such a statement by Mr. Oliver is particularly curious since his tenure at the FTC
was probablythemost permissiveofmodemtimes. Itis also curiousgiventheevidence
presented in the mid 1980s by Combs and Marion and by Wills that within food
manufacturing, cooperatives have little market power. Combs and Marion, drawing
on census data for 1977, found the 100 largest agricultural cooperatives accounted
for 5.7 percent ofthe value-of-shipments and 3.1 percent ofthe value-added in all
food and tobacco manufacturing. And cooperatives held only 7.4 percent of the
leading (top four) positions in food manufacturing productclasses. Productclasses in
which cooperatives were most active were characterized by low levels ofvalue-added,
productdifferentiation, andsales concentration. Thesearecharacteristicsofrelatively
competitive product classes.
In contrast, the 100 largest investor-owned food manufacturers were particularly
strong in product classes with high seller concentration and product differentiation.
In 1982, these companies did 92 percent ofall measured media advertising offood
and tobacco products. They held 66 percent ofthe four leading positions in the 141
census product classes and 80 percent ofthe leading positions in productclasses with
high product differentiation (Connor et al., p. 122).
Combs and Marionconcluded: "Incompansonto proprietaryfood manufacturers,
cooperative ability to enhance price is infinitesimal" (p. 49).
Using- Nielsen data on more narrowly defined products, Wills came to a similar
conclusIon. Cooperatives owned the leadingbrand III 15 ofthe 145 products in Wills'
data set. Included were such brands as Land O'Lakes, Sunsweet, Sun Maid, Welch,
Ocean Spray, and Treetop. However, Wills found that market share and advertising
had less price-enhancing effects on cooperative brands than on proprietary brands.
He concluded, "there is no evidence that cooperatives in general enhance price
significantly above competition levels" (p. 190).
Finally, in a recent study ofthe competitive impacts ofcooperatives, Petraglia and
Rogers found that the presence of cooperatives had a salutatory effect on food
manufacturingmarket performance. Using an econometric model, these researchers
found the percentage ofa market's shipments held by the largest cooperatives had
a significant negative relationship to the market's price-cost margin, especially in
concentrated markets.
Given the above conclusions, Oliver's concerns appear to have little foundation.
Theremainderofthis paper updates the Combs-Marion analysis to 1982 to see ifthe
conclusions concerning the lack ofmarket power ofcooperatives still holds. In addi-
tion, some observations will be madeconcerning thestrategic behaviorofagricultural
marketing coo~ratives. Throughout the paper, cooperatives and investor-owned
firms (IOFs) will be compared.
Cooperatives Selected
Thedata onwhich the remainderofthis paper is based are from a special Bureau
of the Census tabulation of food manufacturing for 1982. To determine how theCooperative Food Manufacturing/Rogers and Marion
Table I.-Participation of Largest 100 Agricultural Marketing
Cooperatives by Selected SIC Industry Groups, 1982
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Percentage of Total
No. of Co-ops Establishments in
With Shipments SIC 20 + 51
SIC Top 20 Top 100 Top 20 Top 100
20 Food Manufacturing 16 68 42 39
51 Wholesale- 19 78 58 61
Nondurable
514 Groceries & Related 11 52 19 26
Products
5143 Dairy Products 9 33 16 18
515 Farm-product Raw 12 35 39 35
Materials
5153 Grain 9 21 32 23
Source: Special tabulation by the Bureau of the Census.
largest agricultural marketing cooperatives fared in food manufacturing, the 100
largest were selected from a list ofthe largest 500 agricultural cooperatives supplied
to the Bureau of the Census by the Agricultural Cooperative Service of the U.S.
Department of Agriculture. The Bureau of the Census selected the cooperatives
based on their sales in SIC 20 and 21, food and tobacco manufacturing; in SIC 514,
wholesaling trade-groceries and related products (less SIC 5141, wholesaling of
generalline groceries); andinSIC515, wholesaletrade-farmproductraw materials. l
Since the 100 largest cooperatives were chosen based on their sales in food and
tobacco manufacturing and in parts of the wholesale trade, it is interesting to note
the actual distribution between those two broad categories. When considering the
combined sales ofthecooperatives in only these two broad sectors, 47 percentoftheir
sales were in food manufacturing (SIC 20) and 53 percent in wholesaling (SIC 51).
Within wholesaling, farm product raw materials was more important with the top
100 cooperatives having 62 percentoftheirwholesale sales in raw materials (SIC 515)
as opposed to 38 percent in groceries and related products (SIC 514, less 5141).
Thirty-two ofthese cooperatives had no shipments in SIC 20 and were included
only because oftheirwholesalingactivities. Thetop 100 included severalcooperatives
with substantial wholesale sales in either dairy or grain (table 1). Two out of three
wholesaling establishments ofthe top 100 cooperatives were devoted to either dairy
or grain. The remaining 4-digit SICs under 514 or 515 are not shown.
Importance ofCooperatives in Food Manufacturing
The 100 largest agricultural marketing cooperatives accounted for 6.9 percent of
the total value-of-shipments in food and tobacco manufacturing in 1982, an increase
from the 5.7 percentshare held in 1977 (table 2). Nocooperativesoperatedin tobacco
manufacturing in 1982 orin 1977. The 20 largest cooperatives held most ofthat6.962 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1990
Table 2.-Percentage ofTotal Food and Tobacco Manufacturing Value-of-
Shipments and Value-Added by the 100 Largest Agricultural











Percentage of Universe Total
in Food and Tobacco Manufacturing
Value-of-Shipment Value-Added
1~2 IM7 1~2 IM7
4.5 3.1 1.9 1.3
1.3 1.4 I.l 0.9
I.l I.l 0.7 0.9
6.9 5.7 3.6 3.1
23.6 20.2 34.0 27.4
16.8 14.2 16.0 15.9
52.4 48.8 61.2 55.0
Source: Special tabulation by the Bureau of the Census.
aFive cooperatives are included in the 100 largest in 1982.
percent share, with a 4.5 percent share ofvalue-of-shipments in 1982, up from 3.1
percent in 1977. The remaining 80 cooperatives experienced a slight decrease in
combined share since 1977.
Based on value-added, the 100 largest cooperatives held only a 3.6 percent share
in 1982, up from 3.1 percent in 1977. Thesefigures reflect the fact thatcooperatives
tend to operate in first-stage food manufacturing industries with lower than average
value-added to value-of-shipments ratios. The ratio ofvalue-added to value-of-ship-
ments for the 47 food industries that make up food manufacturing was 31.5 percent
in 1982. For the 100 cooperatives, the ratio ofvalue-added to value-of-shipments for
their food manufacturing activities was only 17.2 percent, showing a clear tendency
for the cooperatives to be in low value-added industries.
As might be expected, leading cooperatives are much smaller than leading IOFs
in food and tobacco manufacturing. Ofthe68 cooperatives with some food manufac-
turing sales, none ranked among the largest 50 food and tobacco manufacturers
ranked by value-added. Five cooperatives ranked among the 51-100 largest food and
tobacco manufacturers in 1982, up from 2 in 1977 (table 3). Cooperatives were more
represented in the 101 to 200 largest food and tobacco manufacturers with 17 in
1982. In total, only 39ofthe top 100 cooperatives rankedamongthelargest 500 food
and tobacco manufacturers in 1982.
Since cooperatives operate in the lower value-added food industries, they rank
higher when sales rather than value-added are used for the basis ofthe rankings. A
list ofthe 50 largest food manufacturers in 1982 (Connor et al., p. 161), ranked by
food sales (excluding tobacco), had nocooperatives rankedamongthe 20 largestfood
manufacturers in 1982. However, four cooperatives ranked in the 21-50 largest
group,whereasnocooperativeswereamongthe50largestfood andtobaccomanufac-
turerswhen value-added was the basis for the rankingin table 3. Thesefourcoopera-Cooperative Food ManufacturinglRogers and Marion 63
Table 3.-Ranking of the 100 Largest Agricultural Marketing Cooperatives
among the 500 Largest Food and Tobacco Manufacturing
Companies, 1977 and 1982
100 Cooperative Rankingsb
Rank of 500 1-20 21-50 51-100 1-100
Companies' 1982 1977 1982 1977 1982 1977 1982 1977
50 Largest 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
51-100 Largest 4 2 1 0 0 0 5 2
101-200 Largest 8 7 8 5 1 3 17 15
200-500 Largest 1 3 5 8 11 14 17 25
1-500 Largest 13 12 14 13 12 17 39 42
Not Among 500 7 8 16 17 38 33 61 58
Largest
Source: Special tabulation by the Bureau of tbe Census.
'The 500 companies are ranked by tbeir value-added in SIC 20 and 21.
beooperatives are ranked by their value-of-sales in SIC 20. 21, 514 (less 5141), and 515 and in 0722 and 0734 in 1977 but not in
the 1982 ranking. Ranking of the 100 cooperatives within the 500 largest food manufacturing companies was done using each
cooperative's value-added in SIC 20 and 21.
tives were dairy cooperatives with most of their sales in the bulk handling of fluid
milk rather than in the more value-added dairy industries.
Thelargest 20 investor-owned food and tobacco manufacturers have continued to
expand their share ofall value-added in SIC 20 (figure 1). Indeed, the increase in
value-added share by the top 100 and 500 food and tobacco manufacturers from
1967 to 1982 is totally accounted for by the growth ofthe top 20. The value-added
share ofthe top 20 food and tobacco manufacturersjumped sharply from 1977 to
1982, and again from 1982 to 1988, reflecting the many mergers involving large food
manufacturers during this period.
Concern about the economic power ofcertain companies may be based on their
overall size, often referred to as conglomerate power, or it may be based on their
power within certain markets. Market power, the latter, is normally judged by the
market share ofindividual companies, the concentration ofsales among the leading
firms, the level ofproduct differentiation, and barriers to entry and exit.
The foregoing suggests that the overall size of marketing cooperatives is on the
puny side when compared with the top 20, 50, and 100 IOFs in food and tobacco
manufacturing. These comparisons did not include sales outside ofSIC 20 and 21.
Thus, substantial sales by cooperatives in wholesalingwere ignored. However,judged
by their size in food and tobacco manufacturing, cooperatives hardly appear to be
the "behemoths" referred to by Chairman Oliver. We tum our attention now to
evidence ofmarket power in food and tobacco manufacturing by cooperatives and
IOFs, examiningparticularly productdifferentiation, marketconcentration, andmar-
ket shares.
Where Is There Market Power in Food and Tobacco
Manufacturing and Do Cooperatives Share in It?
Previous research ofcompetition in food and tobacco manufacturing has found a
pervasive linkage between productdifferentiation and market power (Connoretal.).64 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION
Figure l.-Aggregrate Concentration among the Largest 100 Food and
Tobacco Manufacturing Companies
Selected Years 1967-88
Percent of Value Added
1990
80.-----------------------------,
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Source, Special tabulations by the Bureau of Census. 1988 estimated from trade sources.
Absent product differentiation, entry barriers into most food processing industries
are modest. Market power derived from a large market share and/or oligopolistic
interdependence alone tends to be limited. When these are combined, however, with
higWy differentiated products, market power premiums can soar.
When 45 national industries in food and tobacco manufacturing were separated
into groups by the degree ofproductdifferentiation (based on industry advertising-
to-sales ratios), the percentage ofvalue-added controlled by cooperatives declined as
productdifferentiation increased (table 4). Thetop 100 cooperatives held 8.0 percent
ofthe value-added in the no productdifferentiation group, which contained mainly
producer goods industries, a 4.9 percent share in the low product differentiation
group, a 6.2 percentshare in the medium productdifferentiation group, and only a
0.3 percent share in the higWy differentiated group. The opposite was true for the
top 20 food and tobacco companies (none ofwhich were cooperatives); the top 20
had only a 5.3 percent share of the no product differentiation group but a 46.8
percentshareofthe highly differentiated group's valued-added. Clearly cooperatives
were not active in industries characterized by heavy promotional efforts in direct
contrast to the large investor-owned firms that dominated the highly differentiated
group.Cooperative Food ManufacturinglRogers and Marion
Table 4.-The Largest 100 Agricultural Marketing Cooperatives' Activity






























Source: Special tabulation by the Bureau of the Census.
Note: The number in parenthesis is the number of national industries that are classified in this product differentiation group.
Thesix local industries not included here are: 2024. 2026. 2048. 2051. 2086, 2097, None ofthe 100 cooperatives were in
2051 or 2097,
Although the top 100 cooperatives held 6.9 percentofall food and tobacco manu-
facturingshipments, thatoverallshareconceals substantialdifferencesincooperatives'
combined market share in more narrowly defined food industry groups (table 5).
Since the Bureau ofthe Census required that at least six cooperatives participate in
an industry group or industry before they would release shipments data, more
detailed data were not provided.
'rhe market share held by cooperatives in 1982 in these more narrowly defined
food groups varied from zero in the bakery products industry group to 53.2 percent
in the butter industry. Four-digit industries in which cooperatives accounted for at
least 10 percentofthevalue-of-shipments in 1982 includedbutter, cheese, condensed
milk, fluid milk, canned fruits and vegetables, prepared feeds, and soybean oil meal
products (table 5).
Dairy was clearly the dominant product these cooperatives processed. The 68
cooperatives with some food manufacturing shipments in 1982 had $20.6 billion in
food shipmentsin thatyear. Nearly half(47%) ofthese shipmentswere dairy products
in 1982, up from 39 percent in 1977.
Cooperatives rarely held a sizable market share in any of the national food and
tobacco industries. No cooperatives held a market share of30 percent or higher in
any ofthe 45 national industries in either 1977 or 1982. In contrast, 11 ofthe top 20
investor-owned firms held a market share of30 percent or higher in at least one of
these 45 industries. Only 4 of the top 100 cooperatives held market shares
of 15 percent or more in 1982, whereas 34 of the top 100 IOFs held such
market shares.
Table6comparesthe percentageofcompanyshipmentsderivedfrom various
market shares held in national food and tobacco product classes. Whereas the
largest cooperatives obtain virtually no sales from market shares of20 percent
or more, the 20 largest IOFs obtain over halftheir sales from market shares of
20 percent or greater. The largest 20 IOFs are in a class by themselves even
when compared with the 100 largest IOFs.Table 5.-The 100 Largest Agricultural Cooperatives' Activity in Food and Tobacco Manufacturing at the 2-Digit,
3-Digit, and Selected 4-Digit SIC Levels for 1977 and 1982
Percentage of Universe Total
No. of Co-opsa Value-of-Shipments Change
SIC Name 1982 1977 1982 1977 1982-77
percentage
---------percent--------- point change
20 Food & Kindred Products 68 71 7.2 6.0 1.2
201 Meat Products 6 9 4.2 2.3 2.0
202 Dairy Products 32 28 24.4 17.7 6.7
2021 Butter 22 19 53.2 43.1 10.1
2022 Cheese, Natural & Processed 19 18 24.0 16.7 7.4
2023 Condensed & Evaporated Milk 31 25 34.0 27.3 6.7
2024 Ice Cream & Ices 16 18 7.7 5.2 2.5
2026 Fluid Milk 29 27 21.3 15.6 5.7
203 Preserved Fruits & Vegetables 27 32 8.9 8.3 0.6
2033 Canned Fruits & Vegetables 23 24 17.0 13.7 3.3
2037 Frozen Fruits & Vegetables 9 10 7.7 10.4 -2.7
204 Grain Mill Products 23 25 6.4 7.1 -0.7
2048 Prepared Feeds 18 18 10.7 12.0 -1.3
205 Bakery Products 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
206 Sugar & Confectionary Products 7 6 6.7 5.9 0.8
207 Fats & Oils 12 16 9.6 12.0 -2.4
2075 Soybean Oil Meal Products 8 8 15.2 N/A N/A
208 Beverages 27 23 1.4 0.9 0.5
2086 Bottled & Canned Soft Drinks 21 21 1.9 N/A N/A
209 Miscellaneous Foods & Kindred Products 18 8 0.4 0.4 0.0
2099 Prepared Foods, N.E.C. 17 8 0.8 N/A N/A
21 Tobacco Products 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: Special tabulation by the Bureau ofthe Census.
Cooperatives are ranked by their value of sales in SIC 20, 21, 514 (except 5141), and 515. Five-digit product class value-of-shipments data have been used in calcuhtting percentages.
aNumber ofcooperatives from the top 100 sample processing some output in this industry group or industry.
N/A ~ Not availableCooperative Food Manufacturing/Rogers and Marion
Table G.-Share of Company Shipments in Various Market Share




10% or More 20% or More 30% or More
Cooperativesb
20 Largest 19.5 0.7e 0.0
100 Largest 19.6 1.9 0.0
Investor-Owned Firms'
20 Largest 75.1 56.6 40.6
100 Largestd 60.4 38.3 23.0
e = estimated.
apercentage ofthe size group total value-of-shipments in 136 national food and tobacco manufacturing product classes with the
given market share.
bRanked by sales in SIC 20. 21, plus SIC 51 .
'Ranked by value-added in SIC 20 and 21.
dFive cooperatives. ranked in the 51-100 largest, are among the 100 largest.
Leading Positions Held by Cooperatives
For the first time, the 1982 special tabulation provided data on the leading
positions held by cooperatives at the 4-digit industry level and the 5-digit prod-
uct class leveL In 20 of the 51 food and tobacco industries (45 national and 6
local industries), cooperatives held at least one ofthe top eight positions. They
held three of the top four positions in butter (SIC 2021) and two of the top
four positions in cheese (SIC 2022), canned fruits and vegetables (SIC 2033),
dehydrated fruits and vegetables (SIC 2034), and milled rice (SIC 2044),
Table 7 breaks the 51 four-digit industries into five value-added to value-of-
shipment (VAlVS) quintiles. The largest 100 cooperatives held most of their
leading positions in the first quintile-that is the one with the lowest VAIVS,
The 11 industries in this quintile also had low price-cost margins and very low
advertising to sales.
In contrast, the cooperatives had no leading positions in the quintile with the
highest ratio of value-added to value-of-shipments, The 10 industries in that
quintile had very high price-cost margins, high four-firm concentration ratios,
and high advertising intensity. Thus, cooperative leading positions tended to
be inversely related to those characteristics associated with market power.
The Bureau of the Census defines 161 product classes in food and tobacco
manufacturing, with 136 classified as national product classes and 25 as local
product classes by the authors based on the average distance the product was
shipped (see Connor et al.), Cooperatives held a similar share of the leading
positions in the local productclasses as they held in the national productclasses,
Thetop 100cooperatives held5.1 (7.2) percentofthenumber 1(top4) positions
in the national product classes and 4,0 (11.0) percent of the number I (top 4)
positions in the local product classes (table 8), In both the national and local
product classes, the cooperatives held their largest percentage ofleading posi-
tions in the undifferentiated product classes,68 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1990
Table 7.-Leading Positions Held by 100 Largest Agricultural Marketing
Cooperatives in Food and Tobacco Manufacturing Industries, by
















VAJVS No. of SICs 1-4 1-8 VS PCM CR4 TAS
15.6 II 10 19 869.7 10.9 44.5 0.2
25.6 10 5 8 543.0 17.6 35.7 0.5
36.4 10 2 3 598.7 27.5 47.6 2.2
46.1 10 2 4 419.1 34.4 46.2 3.2
61.3 10 0 0 447.7 46.8 64.6 3.9
51 19 34
Value-of-shipments ($ million).
Ratio of value-added to value-or-shipments in percent.
Price-cost margin in percent.
Four-firm concentration ratio in percent.
Seven media advertising-to-sales ratio in percent.
Source: Census of Manufacturers and special tabulation by the Bureau of the Census.
Investor-owned companies displayed the opposite pattern, holding a greater
share of the leading positions in the most differentiated category of product
classes. The top 20 IOFs held nearly 60 percent of the number 1 positions in
the 42 highly differentiated product classes, whereas the top 20 cooperatives
never held a number one spot in any of these product classes. For all 161
product classes, the top 100 IOFs held 77 percentofthe number one positions
compared with 5 percent for the largest 100 cooperatives.
In table 9, key market characteristics are given for product classes in which
cooperatives held varying numbers of the top eight positions. The 100 largest
cooperatives held three or more ofthe top eight positions in only nine product
classes. Cooperatives held the numberone position in seven productclasses and
the number two position in 13 product classes. Out of 136 national product
classes, this hardly strikes us as a position ofdominance. What are the product
classes where cooperatives ranked number 1in 1982? Butter, dry milk, concen-
trated milk, ice cream mix, bulk milk, milled rice, and fruit drinks-hardly a
group known for its market power. In table 9, we once again find cooperative
leading positions tend to be predominantly in product classes with low price-
cost margins, low CR4, and low advertising to sales. In fact, cooperatives held
only one numberone position outofthe 84 national productclasses with a CR4
of50 percent or more, whereas they held six number one positions in the 56
national product classes with CR4 less than 50 percent.
The preceding discussion ofthe three primary market characteristics-mar-
ket size, concentration, and product differentiation-can be jointly related to
cooperative participation by a simple probit model that predicts in which prod-
uctclasses cooperatives participated.The model provides a nice summaryofthe
combined influences ofthe key structural variables associated with cooperative
participation. The probit model had the following form:Cooperative Food Manufacturing/Rogers and Marion 69
Table 8.-Positions Held by the Largest 100 Agricultural Cooperatives in
161 National and Local Product Classes, by Degree of Product
Differentiation, 1982





















































f (Invas, CR4, TAS, NL) where:
1 ifat least one ofthe top 100 cooperatives participated and
oif none participated
the natural log of the product classes value-of-shipments
= the four-firm concentration ratio
the seven major media advertising-to-shipments ratio
oif the product class is a national product class and 1 ifthe
product class is a local product class
Cooperatives participatedin 102 ofthefood andtobacco productclassesanddid
not participate in the other 59 product classes. The model correctly predicted
cooperative participation in 70 percentofthe 161 productclasses, with coopera-
tives more likely to participate in product classes where advertising intensity
and concentration were lower and in the larger product classes. The national-
local dummy variable was not significant but does serve as a correction factor
for CR4 being measured on a national basis.
In sum, cooperatives have a respectable presence in parts ofthe food manu-
facturing sector, but have nowhere near the domination held by their investor-
owned counterparts. Cooperatives typically had their strongest positions in
those food manufacturing markets that are more commodity oriented, less
differentiated, with low value-added to sales ratios, and low margins. Coopera-
tives seldom compete directly with the 20 largest food and tobacco companies,
which are all investor-owned companies and have dominant positions in the70 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION
Table 9.-Leading Positions Held by Largest 100 Cooperatives in
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No. of 1-8




















2113.4 .14 37.1 0.5
1239.5 .24 52.1 1.3
2092.7 .19 53.4 0.6
1563.0 .29 54.8 2.0
1095.5 .29 67.6 2.7
1532.1 .25 58.0 1.8
where: VS Value-of-shipments ($ millions).
peM Price-cost margin in percent.
CR4 Four-firm concentration ratio in percent.
TAS . Seven media advertising-to-sales ratio in percent.
Source: Census of Manufacturers and special tabulation by the Bureau of the Census.
more concentrated, more processed, more differentiated, higher margin mar-
kets.
We are not arguing that market power by cooperatives-to the extent it
exists-should be ignored. Market power, whether in the hands ofcooperative
or noncooperative organizations, should be of concern to those vested with
preservingand protectingcompetition in the U.S. economy. However, ifpublic
policy attention is orderedby the potential negativeconsequences for American
consumers, the evidence presented in this report indicates that agricultural
cooperatives will be far down the list.
Strategic Behavior of Cooperatives
What does the foregoing tell us about the strategic behaviorofcooperatives?
In 1982 as in 1977, cooperatives were largely located in food manufacturing
industries that appear to have little market power. Why is this the case? Are
cooperative boards and manag.ers disinterested in the higher prices and profits
that come with market power? Or, are cooperatives unskilled in differentiating
products and in competing with the leading investor-owned firms that hold
strong positions in differentiated product industries? Or, are other factors
driving the selection of industries by cooperatives?
We have puzzled over these and otherquestions about the strategic behavior
ofcooperatives. There are several points that may help explain the absence of
cooperatives from market power positions.2
I. Ifcooperatives are a vertical extensionoffarmer-members' asset base, the
greatest amount of activity will be closest to the integrator-in this case,
the farmer. From this standpoint, it is logical that cooperatives are most
heavily involved in first-stage marketing and food processing activities.Cooperative Food Manufacturing/Rogers and Marion 71
These are the businesses to whom farmers sell their products. IOFs, in
contrast, may start out as a cookie manufacturer, flour miller, or grain
elevator and may vertically integrate backwards toward the farmer or
forward toward the consumer. IOFs are not attached to one stage in the
food system, as is true with cooperatives.
2. The influence of governing boards should not be overlooked (Caswell).
Most cooperative boards are very homogeneous since they are made up
of all farmers. This also means these boards are very user oriented and
tend to be product driven. IOF boards are not user oriented, have a very
heterogenous composition, and tend to be primarily profit driven.
3. Given the above two characteristics, it is not surprising that cooperatives
are most heavily involved in the first stages of processing of selected
commodities that their members produce. In this way, they assure their
members of a market for their farm output. In some cases cooperatives
acquire food processing business specifically to protect a market for their
grower-members.
4. In most commodities, the amountofprocessingand value-added is much
greater in later processing stages than in early processing stages. It is
primarilythelaterstage productsthatlendthemselves toproductdifferen-
tiation. Given the propensity of cooperatives to integrate into the first
handling and processing stages of the commodities their members pro-
duce, thIS places them in low value-added and low differentiation markets.
In contrast, IOF brands are not tied to a particular stage and are more
likely to choose industries into which to integrate on the basis ofpotential
profits.
5. Past research has identified the structural characteristics associated with
market power. However, for firms that do not have market power, it may
be difficult to obtain.
Cooperatives often find themselves undercapitalized. If successful product
differentiation requires substantial investments in R&D and advertising, many
cooperatives may not have the resources.
In addition, positionsofmarket powerin U.S. food and tobacco manufactur-
ing are currently held mainly by large IOFs. Other firms (including coopera-
tives) may covet such positions but may have neither the resources nor the
endurance to dethrone the market leaders. Challenging the likes of Phillip
Morris, RJR Nabisco, General Mills, Con Agra, Pepsico, Pillsbury, or Ralston
Purina is for many firms like jumping from sandlot baseball to the major
leagues. For example, Ralston Purina ranked 11th in advertising among food
manufacturers in 1982 but still had 10 times the advertising expenditures of
Land O'Lakes, the largest cooperative advertiser.
Concluding Comments
Thisstudyexamined theextenttowhich largeagricultural marketingcooper-
atives were involved in food and tobacco manufacturing in 1977 and 1982.
Census data allowed us to identify the industries in which cooperatives were
most active, the extent to which cooperatives held leading positions, and the
extent to which they appeared to hold positions with market power.
Ourconclusions are similar to those drawnearlierby Combs and Marion and
by Wills. Within food and tobacco manufacturing, cooperatives appear to have72 JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION 1990
little market power. And when compared with the largest 20 and 100 investor-
owned food and tobacco manufacturing firms, the size and market power of
cooperatives is like a mosquito on an elephant's rump.
It may well be that our analysis has missed the most important positions of
cooperative marketpower. Thefirst handlersoffarm productionaresometimes
not classified as food manufacturing and hence would be excluded from our
analysis. In particular, grain elevators and raw milk assembly, cooling and
pump-over stations are classified as wholesaling. If cooperatives derive their
greatest market power from their control over the raw product, then such
wholesaling markets need to be examined. Farmer first-handler markets are
often relatIvely small geographically. In order to understand these markets,
data on local and regional markets would be needed.
For cooperatives to have market power, they must be able to manage the
production response oftheir members. Jesse et al. argued that the production
response can be managed by "restricting the number of members, restricting
individual member deliveries, or price discrimination involving diversion of
some production outofthe major market" (p. 439). Relatively few cooperatives
have closed membership. However, many cooperatives do control their supply
through production contracts or quotas. As a result, some price enhancement
may be achieved by cooperatives. Absentfurther processingandproductdiffer-
entiation, however, we would expect any price enhancement to be modest
particularly when compared with the price enhancement by large IOFs.
We find no trouble with calls to examine the competitive Impact ofcoopera-
tives and to challenge cooperative mergers or agencies in common that are
substantially anticompetitive as long as similar anticompetitive actions by IOFs
are pursued with equalenthusiasm. We do have difficulty with those like Daniel
Oliverwho find few antitrust problemselsewhere in the food system yet pounce
on cooperatives. We tend to agree with Willard Mueller who suggested:
"The performance ofcooperatives should bejudged within the context of an economy
where varying degrees of market power are the rule, not the exception, and a public
policy environment in which little has or is likely to be done about existing entrenched
power" (p. 252).
Notes
1. Inthe 1977special tabulation,theselectionofthe 100 largestagriculturalmarketing
cooperatives also included their sales in SICs 0722, crop harvesting services, and 0723,
crop preparation services for market (for more information on the 1977 special tabula-
tion of cooperatives see Combs and Marion). These two SICs were not used in the
1982 ranking, yet the difference was considered insignificant by Bureau of the Census
personnel.
2. This section benefited from discussions with Michael Cook, Robert D. Partridge
Professor of Cooperative Leadership, University of Missouri, and Richard Vilstrup,
former professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Wisconsin.
3. According to Areida and Turner, "moderate enhancement of price is always
permissible..." without violating Section 2 of Capper-Volstead (Jesse et aI., p. 442).
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